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This paper analyses the export market entry decisions of Dutch firms and their subsequent 
growth or market exit. Exporters, particularly when entering new markets, have to learn 
about market conditions and to search for new trade relations under uncertainty. In that 
sense the paper also investigates the role of economic diplomacy  and knowledge 
spillovers from colleague-exporters. We combine detailed international trade data by firm 
and destination between 2002 and 2008 with firm data and export market characteristics 
in order to disentangle the firm and country determinants of successful and less successful 
export behaviour. First, we find that about 5% of all Dutch exporters have just started in 
their first market and a similar share of exporters ceases all  exports.  Still, the starting 
exporters increase their exports very fast. In each market their export growth in their third 
year as exporter is about twice as high as for established exporters. Many starters also 
increase their exports by  expanding their number of destinations, but they will retreat 
swiftly if they are not successful. For all exporters we find that more productive and larger 
firms are more inclined to enter (additional) export markets, and that larger firms are less 
likely to leave a market. Market characteristics are important as well. Distance and import 
tariffs reduce the probability to enter the market and increase the probability to exit. Not 
only distance to the  home country matters, but also the distance to export markets 
already accessed. Firms seem to follow a stepping stone approach for reaching markets 
further away (physically and culturally). They first enter more nearby  markets before 
moving to more distant markets. Finally, we find that the presence of support offices 
abroad and trade missions in destination countries, particularly middle income countries, 
stimulate the entry of new  exporters and the growth of export volume. Knowledge 
spillovers from exporters with the same destinations have also positive effects on market 
entry. 
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Abstract 
This paper analyses the export market entry decisions of Dutch firms and their subsequent growth or market 
exit. Exporters, particularly when entering new markets, have to learn about market conditions and to search for 
new trade relations under uncertainty. In that sense the paper also investigates the role of economic diplomacy 
and knowledge spillovers from colleague-exporters. We combine detailed international trade data by firm and 
destination between 2002 and 2008 with firm data and export market characteristics in order to disentangle the 
firm and country determinants of successful and less successful export behaviour. First, we find that about 5% 
of all Dutch exporters have just started in their first market and a similar share of exporters ceases all exports. 
Still, the starting exporters increase their exports very fast. In each market their export growth in their third year 
as exporter is about twice as high as for established exporters. Many starters also increase their exports by 
expanding their number of destinations, but they will retreat swiftly if they are not successful. For all exporters 
we find that more productive and larger firms are more inclined to enter (additional) export markets, and that 
larger firms are less likely to leave a market. Market characteristics are important as well. Distance and import 
tariffs reduce the probability to enter the market and increase the probability to exit. Not only distance to the 
home country matters, but also the distance to export markets already accessed. Firms seem to follow a stepping 
stone approach for reaching markets further away (physically and culturally). They first enter more nearby 
markets before moving to more distant markets.  Finally, we find that the presence of support offices abroad and 
trade missions in destination countries, particularly middle income countries, stimulate the entry of new 
exporters and the growth of export volume. Knowledge spillovers from exporters with the same destinations 
have also positive effects on market entry.  
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1   Introduction
1 
The top 5% of largest Dutch exporters in manufacturing is responsible for 73% of all goods exports. For 
services exporters this is slightly lower, 62%, but this is still an overwhelming share.
2 Most firms do not trade 
internationally, and many of the exporting firms trade only with one country.
3 Moreover, Roberts and Tybout 
(1997) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) conclude that there is a strong persistence in exporting by firms. 
Exporting firms continue exporting over time and non-exporting firms continue to focus on the domestic 
market. Bernard et al. (2009) and Eaton et al. (2007) confirm these results by concluding that year by year trade 
growth is mainly caused by trade growth of existing exporters. 
This leads to the interesting question how new exporters can become incumbents, and which aspects 
determine their success or failure? The recent empirical literature
4 shows that many firms experiment to export 
for a few years. Sometimes this is succeeded by rapid export growth, but quite often by a disappointing failure 
and exit from the market. Eaton et al. (2007), Albornoz et al. (2010) and Esteve-Pérez et al. (2011), among 
others, suggest theoretically and empirically that new exporters start by selling small amounts to neighbouring 
countries to learn their own export capabilities, before expanding their export to other countries. A central 
element in these theories trying to explain this behaviour is that firms have to learn about market conditions and 
are searching for new trade relations under uncertainty.   
This paper investigates how Dutch exporters cope with these uncertainties, particularly when entering new 
export markets. We focus on three (non exclusive) strategies to reduce the uncertainty involved in exporting. 
Less uncertainty could improve the export decisions of firms and reduce the costs of early exits from foreign 
markets. The first strategy is that firms learn their export capabilities by exporting to neighbouring countries for 
which market entry costs and uncertainty is lower. This is called steppingstone behaviour. The second strategy 
is to learn from other exporting firms in the own region or exporting to a similar destination. The third strategy 
is to build on economic diplomacy of the government. Do trade missions and trade posts increase market entry? 
Except market entry we also analyse the subsequent decisions of firms: export growth and market exit decisions. 
Rauch and Watson (2003) develop a theoretical model in which the success or failure of exporting depends 
on the probability of finding trustworthy and capable distributors and trade relations in the new export market. 
The risk to enter a new export market can be reduced by delivering small amounts first to test the capacity of the 
foreign trade partner. If this is all right exports will increase rapidly, otherwise the exporters will withdraw from 
the new market. Freund and Pierola (2008) formalize this uncertainty by modelling that firms can only learn 
 
1 We appreciate comments of Eric Bartelsman (VU), Steven Brakman (RUG), Henri de Groot (VU), Stefan Groot, Henk Kox, Roger Smeets, Bas 
Straathof and Bas ter Weel (CPB colleagues). We also thank Fred Kuijpers for his statistical assistance, Harry Habets and Willem de Jong 
(Statistics Netherlands) for their assistance and effort to match the datasets, and Frank van Leeuwen (EVD) and Selwyn Moons (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs) for providing data on economic diplomacy. Further, we would like thank the participants of presentations at the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation, Statistics Netherlands and at CPB for providing helpful suggestions. 
2 The numbers are presented in Kox and Rojas Romagosa (2010). This is not a typically Dutch characteristic. Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) show 
that this concentration of exporters is common all over Europe and Bernard and Jensen (1999) show this pattern for the United States. 
3 Statistics Netherlands (2009) concludes that about 8% of the Dutch enterprises has exported goods in 2007. A third of these exporting firms 
have served only one foreign market. 
4 Bešedes and Prusa (2006), Aeberhardt et al. (2009), Esteve-Pérez et al. (2011), Alvarez and Lopez (2008), Eaton et al. (2007), Freund and 
Pierola (2008) conclude that exports rise quickly after a modest but successful begin, or firms retreat quickly from an export market in case of 
failure for the US, France, Spain, Chile, Colombia and Peru, respectively.    5 
about export costs only after they actually export. Eaton et al. (2009) show that previous experiences may affect 
new search and learning activities. Firms that receive better signals will intensify their search for new buyers, 
while firms with poor signals will diminish their searching and/or even cease current export relationships 
particularly after repeated poor signals. Albornoz et al. (2010) suggest that firms do not only test the quality of 
trading partners but also the conditions of market demand. Including the latter uncertainties, they develop a 
formal two-period model in which the uncertainty is resolved after exporting in the first period. This leads to 
export growth and possibly market entry to other markets or market exit decisions. Albornoz et al. (2010) stress 
the importance of recent market entry for export growth and market exit. With data for Argentina they confirm 
the predictions of their model that firms face considerable uncertainty when entering export markets.  
We extend the model of Albornoz et al. (2010), which mainly focus on the role of recent starters. We include 
the distance to nearby export markets (stepping stone behaviour), spillover effects of other exporting firms and 
instruments of economic diplomacy in the market entry decision. We also examine the impact of spillover 
effects and economic diplomacy on export growth. Moreover, we include export market and firm characteristics 
in the analysis of market entry, export growth and market exit.  We use dynamic probit estimators with random 
effects to investigate the market entry and exit decisions and a linear panel estimator with fixed effects for the 
export growth equation. 
We combine detailed international trade data by firm and destination with Dutch firm and export market 
characteristics in order to disentangle the firm and country determinants of successful and less successful 
exporting behaviour. First, descriptive statistics show that most exporting firms continue to export. A substantial 
share of the firms enters new markets, but the share of firms leaving export markets is more or less the same. 
The gross turmoil of firms starting or ceasing exports is about 5% of the total number of exporters between 2003 
and 2007, but the net effect is much smaller. The average export value of both types is similar, but they export 
on average much less than the average incumbent exporter. It is not that firms do not enter new export markets, 
but they fail to continue exporting to these markets. Entrants typically leave the export market or increase their 
exports very fast. Their export growth in their third year as exporter is about twice as high as for continuing 
Dutch exporters. 
The econometric analysis confirms that entry on new markets entails high export growth or swift exit if entry 
is unsuccessful. More productive and larger exporters, particularly firms that recently started to export, are more 
likely to expand their number of export markets than less productive and incumbent exporters. Market 
characteristics matter. First of all, firms are more likely to export to export market nearby the home country or 
nearby export markets already accessed. Stepping stone behaviour seems to be a deliberate strategy to deal with 
export market uncertainty. Distance (to the Netherlands) and import tariffs reduce the probability to enter the 
market and increase the chance to exit. These trade costs have less impact on export growth. Larger markets 
seem to attract more entrants and will reduce the number of exits, and GDP growth stimulates exports to that 
country.  Experience of other exporters to an export market, does also help to enter that market. However, the 
export experience has to be market specific. Spillovers from other exporters within the same region or industry, 
but abstracting from their destinations, are not significant. Economic diplomacy does also help firms to enter 
new markets. Using instrumental variables to correct for endogeneity, bilateral chambers of commerce, trade 
posts and trade missions raise significantly the export probability to a market. Trade missions and the presence 6 
 
of trade posts have also a significant effect on export growth. Overall the firm and export market characteristics 
included in the empirical model provide us with a richer set of results and insights on export behaviour 
compared to other papers.   
The theoretical background of the empirical model and on the impact of policy instruments and spillover 
effects is presented in section two. Section three presents the stylized facts on Dutch firm-export market 
relations and the data sources. Section four focuses on the entry decisions for particular export markets. Here we 
include firm characteristics and market characteristics. The determinants of export growth are presented in 
section five. Sections four and five also investigate the role of Dutch policy instruments and spillover effects. 
Section six concentrates on the firm decisions to leave exports markets and section seven concludes. 
 
2  Literature on firms’ export strategy, policy and spillovers 
2.1  Basic intuitions on firms’ export strategy 
The paper of Albornoz et al. (2010) has triggered our thinking on the uncertainty about export capabilities and 
export markets and the behaviour of firms. Albornoz et al. (2010) develop their arguments in the context of a 
two-country, two-period model. Each firm decides on exporting to two countries, A and B. The trade costs 
(transport costs and import tariffs) for country A are lower than for country B.  They extend the traditional 
Melitz (2003) model by uncertainty with respect to the market entry costs. These entry costs depend on the 
unknown ability of firms to export (such as marketing costs related to the market characteristics) and unknown 
market characteristics. Kneller and Pisu (2007) have gathered detailed information on various types of market 
entry costs using survey data for the UK of a sample of firms participating in export promotion programmes. 
Nearly 30% of the firms identifies networks and marketing as a problem. This includes obtaining basic 
information, establishing and building relationships. 42% of the firms experiences problems with legal and 
administrative procedures in the export market and 37% identifies cultural differences as a market entry barrier. 
   Albornoz et al. (2010) assume that market conditions for market A and B are perfectly correlated and 
constant over time. This crucial assumption implies that firms may start to export to only one market, and use 
the information obtained from that market to assess the profitability of entering the second market. Still, such 
sequential entry entails forgone profits of one year from postponing entry to the second market. Simultaneous 
entry in the first year entails instantaneous gross profits from two markets. But then firms cannot make ex ante 
assessments of market profitability and may export at suboptimal levels on both markets in the first year. The 
level of the fixed costs to enter any market and the firm’s productivity level then jointly determine whether 
simultaneous entry, sequential entry or no entry at all is optimal. The probability of overcoming the market entry 
costs increases with firm’s productivity, consistent with Melitz (2003), and Chaney (2008). 
 Assume that fixed entry costs are such that sequential entry is optimal, and that an exporter survives its first 
entry in market A. In the second year the exporter gains full information on market B, and it will enter that 
market if it is profitable. Further postponement of entering market B after the second year is always suboptimal,   7 
because it provides neither profits nor additional information on market conditions. So, recent starters are more 
likely to enter new markets rather than incumbent exporters.  
The stylized model is rather rigid by the assumption of full information in the second period. Changes over 
time may affect the decision to enter new markets, even for incumbent exporters. For instance, starters will more 
likely enter markets with lower realized market entry costs or more favourable market conditions. Incumbent 
exporters may decide to enter new markets after new changes in market conditions. If we extend the model to 
multiple countries it does not seem to be straightforward that exporting to market A discloses the same amount 
of information for exporting to countries B and C. Assume that the market characteristics (such as culture and 
procedures) are more similar between country A and B than between country A and C. If the firm already 
exports to market A, the uncertainty involved with entering market B is smaller than the uncertainty involved 
with entering  market C. We extend the empirical model by including this possible stepping stone behaviour and 
expect that a firm is more likely to enter a market at a certain distance from the home country if it already 
exports to more nearby markets. We proxy the closeness of a new market of a firm by the smallest distance 
between the new market and existing markets.   
The stepping stone approach is one way of reducing market uncertainty. Knowledge spillovers from other 
exporters are another possibility. We include various types of knowledge spillovers from “colleague exporters” 
in the model. Economic diplomacy could also help to resolve market uncertainty. More specifically it can help 
to deal with government procedures or to overcome cultural differences. Instruments of economic diplomacy, 
such as trade missions, trade posts and bilateral chambers of commerce are incorporated and we expect that 
these instruments could raise the export probability.  
If expected market entry costs are low and consequently expected profits are high, a firm will export the 
maximal amount to market A. If the uncertainty and expected costs are high, the firm will only sell a limited 
amount to experience market demand and his export capabilities. After exporting in the first year, all 
information is available in the model of Albornoz et al. (2010). The firm then decides to leave market A or to 
export the profit-maximising amount. In the latter case the exports will (ceteris paribus) increase rapidly in the 
first year but not in later years on that market.  Moreover, it will decide to enter market B or not. The growth in 
other markets after entry is zero, because with all the necessary information available the exporter will export 
instantaneously at its optimal level.  
As discussed before, all information will not be available after one year, but we do expect that new entrants 
will experience on average higher export growth than incumbent exporters in the first years after market entry.  
This is also the case for market exit. The firm receives a lot of information in the first years of exporting. Then 
they will decide to continue exporting or to leave the market. Therefore we expect that the recent entrants are 




2.2  Role of policy support and spillover effects 
Export promotion is an important activity of many countries. Developed and less developed countries have 
established export promotion agencies (EPA), economic departments of embassies and foreign trade offices 
(business support offices) and conduct trade missions.
5 These institutes and activities are often financed by 
public money and the question comes to the fore whether these activities are effective. In recent years various 
studies have been conducted to examine the impact of these institutions, see Yakop and van Bergeijk (2011) for 
an overview.   
Rose (2007) has stimulated research on economic diplomacy using gravity equations. He and others explain 
the value of (bilateral) trade using standard explanatory variables like GDP and distance and include the number 
of embassies and trade offices.  Rose concludes that one additional consulate or embassy increases exports by 6 
to 10 percent on average in a sample of about 20 developed countries, this effect reduces if the number of 
consulates increases. There is, however, an endogeneity problem, because large exports could also stimulate the 
number of consulates. Using a set a various instruments Rose still finds that export increases by 6%. Nitsch 
(2007) uses a gravity approach to analyse the effect of state and other visits, quite often called trade missions 
with political representation. For the US, France and Germany (with data between 1948 and 2003) he concludes 
that a visit to a country increases bilateral export by 8 to 10 percent. Using a difference-in-difference 
specification and resolving the endogeneity problem, it follows that bilateral exports are 2 to 3%-points higher 
in the first years after the visit, but this effect dies out quickly. Veenstra et al. (2010) discriminate high and 
lower income countries and find that in particular the embassies of high income countries in lower income 
countries have a positive and significant effect on exports. The EPAs from lower income countries seem to be 
effective, as Lederman et al. (2006) concludes, but from high income countries not. Head and Ries (2010) 
analyse the impact of 23 Canadian trade missions headed by the prime minister or the minister of international 
trade starting from 1994. Using a gravity equation they conclude that bilateral trade with countries visited is 
significantly higher, but these visits do not increase bilateral trade in their preferred specification with country 
pair fixed effects. On the one hand, this result suggests that the endogeneity problem could lead to distorted 
outcomes. On the other hand, the use of country-pair fixed effects makes it hard to identify effects of trade 
missions. 
Related is the question whether these government activities support firms to enter export markets and or 
whether these activities help them to increase their exports and to become a mature exporter. Several papers 
inspired by the heterogeneous firms’ literature focus on these issues. Görg et al. (2008) use a difference-in-
difference estimation method to investigate whether grants from the Irish government helps firms to become 
exporters. They conclude it is not, only if the grants are large enough these help already exporting firms to 
become more competitive at the international market. Bernard and Jensen (2004) also conclude that state 
support in the US does not have a significant impact on export market entry of US firms. Volpe Martincus et al. 
(2010) conclude that  the number of export promotion offices has a positive significant impact on the number of 
 
5 See Nitsch (2007), Rose (2007), Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2010), and Van Veenstra et al. (2010). The latter authors also discuss the 
economic rationale for government intervention in export promotion.    9 
traded heterogeneous goods by Latin American and Caribbean countries., while representation by embassies at 
the export market increase the number of exported homogeneous goods.  
Several papers have investigated the role of knowledge spillovers on entry and export volume. 
Using a theoretical network model, Krautheim (2008) argues that information exchange between firms 
exporting to the same countries reduces the fixed entry cost of new exporters, thus pointing to spillover effects 
across exporters. However, empirical results on spillover effects are mixed. For the UK, Greenaway and Kneller 
(2008) find that regional and sectoral agglomeration enhances the entry of new firms to export markets. Instead, 
Bernard and Jensen (2004) find no evidence of regional spillovers effects, industry-specific or region-industry 
spillover effects on the export decision of US manufacturing firms. The latter two papers consider only the 
impact of spillovers on the primary decision of firms to export or not. In a recent paper Koenig et al. (2010) 
extensively investigate local spillover effects on the decision to enter a specific market and on the export volume 
to that market for French exporters between 1998 and 2003. They find significant spillover effects on the entry 
decision, particularly if they can be specified towards product-types or destination-countries, but no spillover 
effects on the export volume. 
3  Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1  Exporter types and related strategic decisions 
Table 3.1 classifies several types of exporters, thereby discriminating between the basic decision to export or not 
and export decisions to specific countries. We distinguish starting exporters and market entrants. Market 
entrants could be starting or incumbent exporters. A similar distinction holds for market exiters and export 
stoppers. Note that these definitions do not include starters ceasing all exports after one year or entrants exiting 
some market after one year  or  firms that export only occasionally over a longer period of time.
6 
 
Table 3.1  Exporter types related to strategic decisions   
Total exports 
    starters  did not export in previous years, but start to export in t and continue in   1 t+  
    continuing exporters   exported in  1 t−  and continue to export in  t and  1 t+  
    stoppers  exported in  1 t−  and in t , but cease to export in subsequent years 
 
Exports to specific country 
    entrants   did not export to country in previous years, but start to export in t and continue in   1 t+  
    incumbents   exported to country in  1 t−  and continue to export in  t and  1 t+  
    exiters  exported to country in  1 t−  and in t , but cease to export in subsequent years 
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the types of exporters and their strategic export decisions of three firms (F1 to F3) 
during year 1 to year 3 on exporting to country X and Y. First, we assume that all three firms supply the 
domestic market, and that in previous years only firm F1exported to country X and no firm exported to country 
 
6 For these firms we cannot include firm specific effects. 10 
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7 In this figure, decision D1 reflects that non-exporters may start to export, like firms F2 and F3 who start in 
year 1 to export to country X. Decision D2 indicates that exporters may enter new countries. Here firms F1 and 
F2 consider to export to Y in year 3, but only firm F2 will take that chance. Finally, decision D3 shows that 
exporters may also decide to exit country X or even stop to export (firms F1 and F3) in year 3, but here only 
firm F3 is doing so. Looking at the scheme from a medium term perspective, we find that firm F2 has become a 
successful starter that has even expanded to several markets, while firm F3 appears to be a non-successful 
starter. 
Finally, as new exporters will enter the market in the course of some year, the calculated export growth of 
the entrant will be upward biased in the second year. To adjust for this, we consider export growth of an entrant 
in its third year and compare it to export growth of incumbent exporters for the same calendar year. In terms of 
figure 3.1, for country X we compare export growth of entrant F2 with export growth of incumbent F1in year 3. 









3.2  Data sources 
We use four datasets at firm level which are all gathered and constructed by Statistics Netherlands. The most 
important source for our analysis is the International Trade (IH) data set. It is a set of customs data extended 
with a survey across Dutch firms on international transactions of imported and exported goods with all countries 
between 2002 and 2008. For each transaction the IH dataset contains information on the country of destination, 
the type of product, the value and the volume in physical units, and the share of the traded value that is related to 
re-exports. Each record is identified by the VAT-number and an IH relation number of a Dutch firm.
8 The IH 
dataset does not include intra-EU transactions of firms with total exports (or imports) below a threshold.
9 Firms 
with smaller exports are expelled from the survey to ease their administrative burden. The IH dataset does 
include additional data from the Dutch Tax Authorities on the sum of all exports by firm, but can not be 
 
7 It is quite standard that exporters remain supplying its domestic market (see for instance Melitz (2003)), but this assumption is not crucial for this 
discussion.   
8 To ease the identification, Statistics Netherlands has created the IH-relation number as a new identifier. This number identifies individual and 
actual exporters with one or more VAT-numbers, but refrains from the legal and organizational status of exporters. This study uses the IH-relation 
number as the main identifier of exporters. 
9 The threshold for the export value is 225 thousand euro until 2005, 400 thousand euro in 2006 and 2007 and 900 thousand euro in 2008.     11
specified towards EU destinations and products. This study uses export data excluding re-exports, deflated to 
export price levels in 2002.   
We combine the IH data with three sources of firm and enterprise data. We use survey data of the Financial 
Statistics of Large Enterprises and of the Production Statistics for firms’ size (measured by employment size in 
fte’s) and for labour productivity.
10 The General Firm Register provides information on the firms’ branch of 
industry and its (main) location at municipal level. We use a matching file, constructed by Statistics 
Netherlands, for linking individual IH-relation numbers with enterprise and firm identifiers in order to match the 
IH data with the firm and enterprise data.
 11 To avoid potential mismatching between trade data and firm 
characteristics, we sum the trade data of all IH relation numbers that are related to the single enterprise or firm.  
The firm level data are complemented with country data. For market size, we use (the log of) total GDP from 
the World Bank Development Indicators. Variable trade costs can be (crudely) decomposed into transport costs 
and trade costs. Transport costs are approximated by the geographical distance between Amsterdam and the 
most populated cities of the trading partners (source: CEPII). For trade costs, we use the average country-level 
import tariffs from the Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2008). 
Note that the regressions might be vulnerable to potential selection bias, particularly due to the threshold in 
registering international trade data and by the matching of trade data to firm- and enterprise data. Appendix A 
provides various robustness checks to check for potential bias due to missing observations of small trade values. 
These checks are based on the same regression models as in section 4 to 6, but use more restrictive and better 
controllable parts of the dataset.  The results of these checks are similar to the results of the main regressions. In 
that sense we argue that the impact of potential selection bias is limited. 
3.3  Descriptive statistics 
This section discusses several descriptive statistics on starting exporters, continuing exporters and firms that 
cease all their exports (stoppers).
12 Table 3.2 presents an overall picture of the export performance of these 
groups over the period 2003 to 2007.
13 The number of continuing exporters is about 17 times as high as the 
number of starters and stoppers. On average, continuers export almost three times as much as starters or as 
stoppers. Dutch exports are mainly generated by continuing exporters. Starters and stoppers each seem to 
contribute only a small fraction total export. Still, the replacement of the smaller stoppers by the larger starters 
contributes 0.7%-point to total export.  
   
 
10 Labour productivity is deflated with value added prices of industries at the 2-digit level.  
11 Each IH relation number is uniquely matched to a single enterprise and/or firm. In reverse direction, however, the match may not be unique. 
Most enterprises or firms are related to one IH-relation number, but some (mainly large) enterprises/firms are related to several IH-relation 
numbers. 
12 The classification of export types is based on firms’ exports excluding re-exports and deflated to the export price level in 2002. 
13 For 2002 and for 2008 we cannot verify whether exporters are starters, continuers or stoppers. Identification for 2002 and 2008 requires data of 
respectively 2001 and 2009, which are not available. 12 
 
Table 3.2  Export performance of Dutch firms (average of 2003-2007, non deflated)  
  all exporters  starters  continuers  stoppers 
                 (in % of all exporters) 
Number of exporters  16592  5.6  89.6  4.8 
Total export value
b  85209  2.4  95.9  1.7 
         
                 (in % of average export value) 
Average export value
a   5134  42.7  107.1  36.5 
 
a Nominal values in thousand euros; 
b nominal values in million euros. 
 
The differences in firm characteristics between starters, continuers and stoppers are smaller. Table 3.3 presents 
firm characteristics of the exporters that could be matched to firm level data, and compares them with the firm 
characteristics of non-exporters.
14 First it shows that exporters are on average more productive and larger than 
non-exporters.
15 Second, the labour productivities of starters, continuers and stoppers are very similar.  
Table 3.3  Firm characteristics of exporters and non-exporters (average of 2003-2007) 
  non-exporters  all exporters  starters  continuers  stoppers 
           
                (in % of all exporters) 
Number of firms  25083  4828  2.6  94.5  2.9 
Total employment (x 1000 fte)  2002  912  3.1  93.2  3.7 
           
               (in % of average of all exporters) 
Average labour productivity (x 1000 euro)  57.3  72.0  99.5  100.1  97.2 
 
Table 3.4 presents the distribution of exporters to the number of destinations. For almost 60% of the exporters 
we can determine their individual export destinations, the other exporters are too small and small intra-EU trade 
values are not surveyed. The best coverage is for continuers. Table 3.4 reveals that starters with observed 
destinations export only to a few countries. About 63% of all starters exports to only one to three countries and 
about 15% to more than 10 destinations. Similar results hold for the stoppers. Continuing exporters, however, 
have a much broader scope. About 25% of the continuers exports to more than 10 countries.
16 These numbers 
suggest that most starters start at a modest scale, but will expand their number of destinations as they become 
“older”.  
Other studies for other countries point to a more “narrow” scope of starting exporters, but differences in 
definitions and classifications distort good comparability. For France, Eaton et al. (2004) show that in 1986, 35 
% of all French manufacturing firms export to only one country, 20% to ten or more countries
17 and only 2% to 
50 or more countries.  The average export value to a destination by the average firm is nearly 1.5 million euro. 
 
14 The number of exporters in table 3.2 is much lower than in table 3.1 because we could not match the other 11764 exporters with firm 
characteristics.  
15 Kox and Rojas-Romagosa (2010) provide a thorough analysis of these productivity differences for Dutch firms and their causes. 
16 This number suggests that the share of exporters serving many destinations is much higher than for the US (see section 2). However, we miss 
many small exporters in this data sample, as argued in section 3.1 
17 In comparison, 24.5% of all Dutch exporting firms sells to 11 or more countries.   13
For Belgium, Onkelinx and Sleuwagen (2010) find that 77% of all SME-firms that started to export between 
1998 and 2005, eventually exported to at most 5 countries.  
Table 3.4  Export destinations for different types of exporters, average of 2003-2007  
  starters  continuers  stoppers  total 
Total number of exporters  302  9209  334  9844 
         
Number of countries                (in % of number of exporters) 
1  40.5  23.9  42.8  25.1 
2  14.4  12.5  14.7  12.7 
3  7.4  8.6  8.6  8.6 
4-10  22.5  29.7  21.5  29.2 
11-20  9.6  16.0  8.5  15.6 
21-40  4.2  7.0  2.9  6.8 
>41  1.4  2.2  1.0  2.1 
         
a Excluding destinations that occur only incidentally for one year.  
 
Table 3.5 illustrates the firms’ “expansion drift” in a more dynamic view. In fact, it follows the cohorts of 
starters and of continuers in 2003 over time, and presents their distributions in the number of destinations in 
2003 and in 2007. First, it reveals that after four years (relatively) more starters (33%) have dropped out than 
continuers (27%). Moreover, in the cohort of starters the number of exporters exporting to one country dropped 
substantially after four years, while the number of exporters exporting to three or more countries increased. In 
the cohort of continuers, we observe a similar shift towards more destinations. Still, the shift of starters is more 
salient and stresses the expansion drift of particularly young exporters.  
Table 3.5  Export destinations for the 2003 cohorts of  starters and continuers, 2003-2007  
                    starters in 2003                    continuers in 2003 
  2003  2007  2003  2007 
         
Total number of (remaining) exporters  394  261  9505  6917 
Exited during 2004/2007    133    2588 
         
Number of countries                (in % of number of (remaining) exporters) 
1  43.9  23.0  24.8  19.4 
2  14.5  13.4  13.5  11.1 
3  8.6  9.6  9.3  8.2 
4-10  21.8  26.4  30.6  30.5 
11-20  6.1  15.7  14.1  19.0 
21-40  4.6  10.0  5.6  9.2 
>41  0.5  1.9  2.1  2.6 
a Excluding destinations that occur only incidentally in one year.  
 
Even though new exporters mostly start with exporting to a “few” destinations at a modest scale, they may grow 
exponentially. Table 3.6 compares total export growth and on average export growth per country for starters and 14 
 
continuers between 2005 and 2007.
18 The most striking result from the table is that for starters the total export 
growth is larger than the total export growth of continuers. The growth in intensive country margin, as reflected 
by average growth per country, is also larger for starters. For the starters, the positive difference between their 
total export growth and the average growth per country is caused by their expansion to other export markets (see 
table 3.5). For the continuers this difference is much smaller, reconfirming that they enter fewer new markets.
19 
Table 3.6  Export growth of starters and continuing exporters, 2005-2007  
                        Total export growth (%)
a          Average export growth per country (%)
 
  starters  continuers  starters  continuers 
2005  36.7  15.2  35.3  17.4 
2006  63.3  21.9  40.5  19.8 
2007  58.3  28.2  41.5  27.4 
         
Average 2005-2007  52.8  21.8  39.1  21.5 
 
a Total export growth of all countries (including those destinations that cannot be specified) 
 
The numbers in this section illustrate that most new exporters start at a modest scale, i.e. often with a relatively 
low export volume to only a few countries. If they appear to be successful, they will expand rapidly by entering 
new markets or by expanding the intensive margins on established markets. The numbers also point to a strong 
similarity between starters and stoppers, but they cannot verify a direct relation between starting and stopping.  
3.4  Policy instruments  
The Dutch government uses several instruments to initiate and stimulate international trade relations which can 
be categorized in two basic groups
20. The first group concerns specific programmes to stimulate and 
occasionally subsidize international trade of individual firms such as starters or exporters to developing 
countries. However, these programmes will not be analyzed here because the participating firms in these 
programmes can not be linked with international trade and firm level data. The second group concerns several 
forms of economic diplomacy. This includes the Netherlands Business support offices and several embassies 
and consulates,
21 and foreign affiliates of bilateral Chambers of Commerce. These offices offer stimulating 
activities and individual guidance to enhance trade with the host countries. Besides, there are trade missions that 
are organized by governments or specific sectors (CPA’s
22).  
 
18 To be precise, for starters we present the growth figures in their third year, so for firms that started in 2003 we present their growth figures in 
2005, etc.  The reason is that new exporters may enter market in the course of some year, so the calculated export growth of the entrant in the 
second year will be upward biased. Note that the total export growth refers to the growth in the intensive and extensive margin. 
19 The negative difference in 2005 is due to the calculation method. The total export growth is an average weighted by country size. The average 
growth per country is non-weighted average across all countries. The negative difference between these two growth figures indicates that exports 
to large and developed countries grow less than exports to small but upcoming markets. 
20 Van den Berg et al. (2008) provide an extensive overview and a social cost-benefit analysis of some programmes and trade missions. 
21 The NBSO’s provide similar activities as the embassies and consulates, but they have no formal diplomatic status (see also www.evd.nl).  
22 The CPA’s (Collective Promotional Actitivity) are colllective activities, for instance trade missions but also visits or stands on international fairs, 
of commercial firms. In advance the organisers of these (planned) CPA’s may submit for a tender to attain a subsidy of the Dutch governments 
(see www.evd.nl)        15
Table 3.7 presents some basic descriptives of Dutch economic diplomacy in several country groups 
(Appendix A provides more details of Dutch economic diplomacy to the 50 largest trade partners in 2007). In 
about a half of all countries there are stimulating activities of bilateral chambers of commerce, NBSO’s and 
embassies. Still, the presence of these offices varies widely over country groups. Many of these offices are 
established in the BRIC countries, particularly in China. They are less represented in EU12 countries and the 
other countries of the 50 largest trade partners. The governmental trade missions mostly focus to upcoming trade 
partners, particularly the BRIC countries and EU 12 countries. The sectoral trade missions (CPA’s) mainly 
focus on the BRIC countries and the EU15 countries (mostly Germany and Belgium), but hardly on EU12 and 
other OECD countries. The CPA’s are particularly related to the food industry, transport equipment industry, 
medical and optical instruments, construction and waste processing. 
   
  Table 3.7  Descriptive statistics of Dutch economic diplomacy for largest 50 trade partners in 2007 
  Country groups 
(number of countries) 
Chambers of 
Commerce 
NBSO, embassy or 
consulates 
Governmental trade missions  
2002-2006  CPA's 2005-2006 















missions per  
country
a 
  EU15   (14)  5  9  2.2  5  1.6  12  5.6 
  EU12   (12)  6  5  1.0  10  1.7  6  3.3 
  Rest OECD (10
 b)  4  6  2.8  4  2.5  5  3.4 
  BRIC  (3
 b)  1  3  6.0  3  3.7  3  8.3 
  Rest top 50  (11)  3  4  1.3  5  1.8  7  3.3 
   
 
a The total  number of establishments of NBSO’s and/or trade offices of embassies, averaged only over the number of countries in which one or more 
establishments are present. A similar procedure holds for governmental trade missions and CPA’s. 
 
b Three countries of other OECD countries (Chile, Mexico and New Zealand) and one BRIC country (Brazil) do not belong to the 50 largest trade 
partners in 2007. 
 
 
4  Market entry 
4.1  Basic model 
New exporters may start exporting to only one (or a few) neighbour countries with relatively low market entry 
costs and uncertainty. If they appear to be successful in their first years as exporter, they will probably expand in 
various dimensions. The results in table 3.5 suggest that starters must expand their foreign markets within a few 
years to become mature continuers. Only 33% of the starters serves four or more foreign destinations, but for 
continuers this number mounts up to 52% in 2003. Continuing exporters may enter new export markets as well, 
particularly due to globalization and opening of new markets.   16 
 
Following Albornoz et al. (2010) we test whether successful export starters are more likely to enter new 
markets than incumbent exporters, and whether exporters use current destinations as a stepping stone to explore 
new markets. The equation reads as:  
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     (4.1) 
is the  probability that exporter i will enter country  k in year  t. The dummy  indicates that exporter 
i started previous year (t-1) as an exporter. Obviously, a positive coefficient of  confirms the basic 
prediction from section 2. Additionally to Albornoz et al. (2010) we evaluate the crucial assumption that 
exporters may use nearby export markets as a “stepping stone” to enter new markets. This strategy may 
particularly be of interest for recent starters.  To check this we include the distance
23 between the new 
destination k in year  t and the closest country to which firm i exported in year t-1 and year t (log￿￿￿￿), and its 
interaction with the dummy   to distinguish between continuing exporters and recent starters. 
Equation (4.1) also includes the “regular” market characteristics, i.e. the level in GDP ( ), the 
distance between the Netherlands and the destination country ( ) as an indicator of transportation cost, 
and the average (ad valorem) import tariffs ( ). Adopting these country characteristics may to some extent 
release the necessity to adjust for country and time specific effects.
24 In order to analyse the role of firm 




We estimate the equation using a probit estimator with random effects in order to control for non-observed firm-
specific effects.
 26 The assumption of random effects is to some extent disputable because the non-observed 
firm-specific effects may be correlated to the firm’s labour productivity or size. Other estimation techniques that 
adjust for firm specific effects are not feasible due to data restrictions. We have not sufficient observations with 
(required) changes in all variables to estimate with logit adjusting for fixed firm specific effects. Estimating a 
linear probability model is problematic as well, because the observed probabilities of entry are very small so that 
estimates of that probability may become negative. Estimating with regular probit, and thus skip the control of 
non-observed firm-specific effects, provide much higher coefficients and seem to overestimate the actual 
marginal effects.  
All results will be presented in terms of marginal effects, i.e. the impact of one percent change from the 
average of the respective determinant on the probability (in percentages) to enter a new market. For 
computational reasons we only include the 50 most important export markets for Dutch firms. To estimate 
 
23 The variable is adjusted for the correlation with the distance to the Netherlands, because in Europe the mutual distances between two countries 
are much smaller than the mutual distances between countries that are more remote from the Netherlands and Europe. 
24 Note that adjusting for country specific effects, besides adjusting for firm specific effects, puts a high burden on computational time, particularly 
as the range of exporting countries of Dutch exporters is very wide (see Smeets et al. 2010). 
25 For labour productivity and employment we could again adopt their interaction with the dummy ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ in order to distinguish between incumbent 
and starting exporters. However, the strong correlation between the interaction term dummy ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ yields implausible regression results. 
26 Probit with fixed effects is theoretically not possible (see for instance Cameron and Trivedi (2005)).    17
equation (4.1) we include only exporters which all do not export to market k in t-1, while in year t some of them 
enter market k while the others remain outside that market. In terms of the scheme in figure 2.1, equation (4.1) 
expresses the decision D2 of exporters F1 and F2 to export to country Y.  
The first regression considers all determinants except the firm specific variables. The results of this regression 
(column (1) in Table 4.1) confirm the basic assertions of Albornoz et al. (2010), the positive and significant 
coefficient of FY indicates that Dutch firms that recently have started to export will more likely enter new 
markets than for incumbent exporters. In fact, new exporters have 0.2%-point higher probability to enter new 
markets than incumbent exporters. This number seems to be small, but is substantial if we take into account that 
the observed probability of entry is about 1.5% per year.  
The first regression also confirms that firms may find it easier to enter new markets if they already export to 
nearby markets. For example, if a firm opts to export to Lithuania, the probability to enter the Lithuanian market 
would be 0.17 %-point higher if its nearest current destination would be Estonia instead of Denmark. The 
significant interaction term (￿￿ ￿ ￿￿) suggests that this effect is amplified for recent export starters. These 
findings indicate (indirectly) that conditions on nearby markets are correlated, and thus that exporters, and 
particularly recent entrants, learn from current export destinations and use them as stepping stones to enter new 
markets.  
 
The impact of country specific effects is according our expectations. Firms are more likely export to countries 
with higher GDP, but less likely to countries at higher distance and with higher import tariffs. As an illustration, 
we compare the entry to the American market with entry to the Austrian market using figures of 2007. Using the 
marginal effects in column (1) we find that the larger market size (GDP) of the USA results in a 0.52%-point 
higher chance to enter that market. But the larger distance to the USA removes the “size advantage” by 0.49%-
point. Even with the absence of tariffs in the EU, Austria eventually has only a 0.03%-point higher chance to be 
entered by a Dutch exporter than the USA. 
The second (and other) regression adds firm specific effects to the basic specification. A higher productivity 
increases the probability to enter a new market, but only at a modest scale. A firm that already exports to other 
countries
27 would have a 0.05%-point higher chance to enter if it could raise its productivity by 50%. This figure 
is not negligible, because the average probability to entry is only 1.8% in this sample. Size also has a positive 
impact on the export probability. For instance, an exporter with 200 employees has nearly a 0.17%-point higher 
chance to enter a new market than an exporter with 100 employees.  
We apply two robustness checks to assess the stepping stone hypothesis. First, we check whether the 
persistence in exporting to the stepping stone country is a necessary condition to enter the new market. The third 
column includes the distance between the new destination and the closest country to which firm i exported only 
in year t-1 instead of years t-1 and t, and its interaction with the dummy . The results, however, are only 
slightly different from the second regression. We also investigate the impact of idiosyncratic productivity shocks 
particularly on entry to new markets. Albornoz et al. (2010) point out that a positive productivity shock may 
ease entry. We extend the analysis on market entry by including firms’ productivity growth.  Note that 
 
27 I.e. with a productivity at the median level of all manufacturing exporters that enter a new market. 18 
 
productivity levels are not necessarily correlated with idiosyncratic productivity shocks, so we keep the 
productivity level in the equation. The last regression in table 4.1 reveals that productivity growth does have a 
positive effect on market entry, but the effect is not significant. Moreover, for recent starters some effects are 
turned over, as the direct effect of being a recent starter (￿￿) diminishes and becomes insignificant, while the 
(additional) stepping stone effect for recent starters (￿￿ ￿ ￿￿) is more than doubled. We take the second 
regression as the baseline for further analysis of the impact of policy (section 4.2) and robustness analysis on the 
dataset (appendix B).  
 
Table 4.1   Decision to enter specific markets (marginal effects in percentage points)  
Dependent variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Entry on specific market   
FY: start to export in t-1  0.168***  0.161***  0.133***  0.054 
(0.020)  (0.070)  (0068)  (0.101) 
LA: Log distance to nearest  market  -0.269***  -0.401***  -0.459*** 
       (in t-1 and t)  (0.009)  (0.019)  (0.023) 
LA x FY  -0.189***  -0.209***  -0.488*** 
(0.025)  (0.069)  (0.148) 
LA1: Log distance to nearest  
market  -0.304*** 
       (only in t-1)  (0.015) 
LA1 x FY  -0.186*** 
(0.060) 
Log GDP  0.149***  0.220***  0.216***  0.260*** 
(0.004)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.010) 
Log distance to Netherlands  -0.262***  -0.365***  -0.374***  -0.425*** 
(0.007)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
Log tariffs  -0.018***  -0.024***  -0.024***  -0.027*** 
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Log productivity (lag)  0.091***  0.095***  0.073** 
(0.019)  (0.018)  (0.030) 
∆ log productivity  0.035 
(0.027) 
Log employment (lag)  0.232***  0.239***  0.276*** 
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.018) 
Observed probability to enter  1.474  1.756  1.756  1.843 
Method  probit with RE  probit with RE  probit with RE  probit with RE 
No observations  1873480  580311  580311  460855 
Log likelihood  -115962  -42810  -42805  -35601 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard error. ***  and * denote respectively 99% and 90% statistical significance.  
The indicated probabilities as well as all marginal effects (and standard errors) are multiplied by 100 so that they reflect probabilities in % and 
marginal effects in %-points. 
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4.2  Impact of economic diplomacy 
We estimate the impact of the policy instruments for economic diplomacy on the entry of firms to export 
destinations and their export growth, and add these trade policy variables to equation (4.1).  
Table 4.2 presents the effects of a foreign affiliate of the Chamber of commerce in the destination country, 
the presence of embassies and NBSO’s, the number of embassies and NBSO’s, the number of trade missions 
and missions by sector. The regressions without adjustments (first row) show that the missions by sector 
(CPA’s) have no significant impact on market entry. The effect is positive, but not discriminating. This could be 
different for specific sectors, but on average we do not find a significant positive effect. The other economic 
diplomacy instruments have a significant and positive impact on the probability to enter a specific export 
market. The export probability will increase by about 0.1%-point if the bilateral chamber of commerce is 
present, which is substantial given the overall export probability of 1.8%. The impact of NBSO’s is slightly 
smaller than for the chamber of commerce. One additional trade mission would raise the export probability by 
about 0.1%-point as well. The number of NBSO’s has a minor effect on the export probability, only 0.01%. We 
are also interested in the question whether these policy instruments are particularly useful for recent starters. 
Therefore we have also added cross terms between a dummy for recent export starters and the policy instrument. 
The resulting coefficients are positive, but not significant.
 28 This suggests that the economic diplomacy 
instruments have no significant additional impact for starting exporters compared to experienced exporters. 
 
As discussed in the literature review the causal relation between trade and the policy instrument is not obvious.  
First of all, governments could decide to support firms because market entry is high. Second, this decision could 
be based on the size of the market and/or market opportunities which is also a decision variable for the firm. For 
that reason we use instrumental variables. So in the first stage, we have instrumented the trade policy 
instruments (except CPA, because these were not significant at all) on GDP/market size, GDP growth and 
distance to the Netherlands. In the second stage, we do not use the predicted value of these trade policy 
instruments based on the explanatory variables, but the predicted errors. These errors may then better capture 
non-trade related reasons for these institutes, for instance guidance and information exchange to entrants. 
The results in table 4.2 show that differences between both approaches, i.e. using adjusted or non-adjusted 
data on economic diplomacy for all countries are minimal. This suggests that the possible endogeneity of the 
trade policy instruments or its correlation with specific causes for market entry, such as market size, distance 
and GDP growth do not affect the estimations results substantially.  
 
Smeets et al. (2010) show that market entry costs are higher in countries with a lower quality of institutions, less 
transparency, more corruption and more cultural dissimilarity. Quite often these are developing countries. It 
could be the case that economic diplomacy is more needed in these countries than in high income countries, 
such as the EU-15 and the USA. To test this hypothesis we separate the instruments of economic diplomacy for 
high income countries (EU-15, ten OECD countries and Singapore and Hong Kong) and for mainly middle 
income and some lower income countries (such as the new EU member states and BRIC countries, see appendix 
 
28 These coefficients are not presented here, but are available on request. 20 
 
A).
29 Table 4.2 presents the respective results of the policy instruments that are adjusted for GDP, GDP growth 
and distance. Overall the impact of NBSO’s and trade missions on market entry is larger in middle income 
countries than in high income countries.
30 In particular, there seems to be no significant positive relation 
between NBSO’s and market entry in high income countries.   
 
Table 4.2   Market entry and economic diplomacy 
Dependent variable 












Non-adjusted policy instruments   
    all countries  0.0530***  0.058***  0.009***  0.085***  0.038 
(0.0148)  (0.018)  (0.004)  (0.015)  (0.052) 
Policy instruments adjusted  for 
GDP, distance to the Netherlands   
    all countries  0.0543***  0.038***  0.008*  0.094*** 
(0.0145)  (0.018)  (0.004)  (0.015) 
    high income countries    -0.0021  0.010  0.082*** 
  (0.026)  (0.007)  (0.026) 
    middle income countries    0.100***  0.007  0.100*** 
  (0.027)  (0.005)  (0.019) 
 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard error. *** and * denote respectively 99% and 90% statistical significance. All marginal effects and 
standard errors are multiplied by 100 so that they reflect marginal effects in %-points. 
All regressions are estimated with a probit model with random effects. The coefficients and standard errors of the other variables from the 
baseline model are similar to those in Table 4.1, column 2. In all regressions the observed probability to enter a specific market is 1.756%, and 
the predicted probability 0.50%.  
 
 
4.3  Spillover effects 
Following Koenig et al (2010), we also investigate the spillover effects on the decision of Dutch exporters to 
enter new markets. Entrants may gain knowlegdge from several types of exporters. To discriminate between the 
types of spillovers, we separately add four indicators to the entry equation to equation (4.1). We include the 
number of exporters in the same municipality as an indicator of local spillovers, the number of exporters in the 
region within 15 km of the firms’ municipality referring to regional spillovers. Further we use the number of 
exporters in the same 2-digit industry reflecting to sectoral spillovers, and the number of exporters to the same 
destination country reflecting country spillovers.
31 The regressions are all estimated with probit with random 
effects but with different cluster variables to adjust for local effects (geographical location and size of 
municipality), industry-specific effects or firm-specific effects. The use of different cluster variables affects the 
magnitude of the baseline coefficients, and consequently the predicted probability to enter a new market.  
 
29 Because the Dutch top 50 of export destinations does nearly not include poor countries, we do not consider these ones. 
30 A similar regression for the chambers of commerce yields implausible results.   
31 The indicator for destination spillovers is adjusted for the impact of country-specific effects (GDP, distance to Netherlands and tariffs) to avoid 
collinearity with the direct effect of the country-specific effects on entry.   21
The results in table 4.4 show that spillover effects are significant between firms exporting to the same 
country (see column 4). The results suggest that the marginal effects of country spillovers would exceed the 
marginal impact of any other determinant.  The impact of spillovers between exporters in the same municipality 
is less eminent. We find no evidence of regional or sectoral spillovers. This finding is to some extent consistent 
with the results of Koenig et al (2010), i.e. that spillovers related to specific markets have the largest impact on 
entry to that market. 










dummy on entry on specific market 
FY: start to export in t-1  0.670***  0.687***  0.880***  0.187*** 
(0.124)  (0.124)  (0.150)  (0.150) 
LA: Log distance to nearest market   -1.28***  -1.25***  -1.44***  -0.380*** 
       (in t-1 and in t)  (0.052)  (0.042)  (0.156)  (0.020) 
LA  x FY  -0.380*  -0.387*  -0.242*  -0.227*** 
(0.134)  (0.131)  (0.117)  (0.076) 
Log GDP  0.349***  0.340***  0.397***  0.192*** 
(0.015)  (0.013)  (0.043)  (0.008) 
Log Distance (to Netherlands)  -0.557***  -0.551***  -0.631***  -0.316*** 
(0.0026)  (0.0023)  (0.070)  (0.0014) 
Log tariffs  -0.026***  -0.023***  -0.034***  -0.015*** 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.002) 
LP: log productivity  0.161***  0.149***  0.218***  0.073*** 
(0.025)  (0.024)  (0.034)  (0.019) 
LE: log employment  0.189***  0.176***  0.283***  0.181*** 
(0.014)  (0.014)  (0.032)  (0.014) 
No. exporters in  same  municipality  0.061* 
(0.036) 
No. exporters in same region  -0.077 
(0.063) 
No. exporters in same industry  0.086 
(0.067) 
No. exporters to same country
a  0.720*** 
(0.041) 
Observed probability to enter  1.616  1.623  1.758  1.621 
Method  probit with RE  probit with RE  probit with RE  probit with RE 
No observations  447636  426922  578651  444975 
Cluster variable   municipality  municipality  industry  exporter 
Number of clusters  437  377  37  4610 
Log likelihood  -33763  -32345  -46708  -33666 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard errors. *** denotes 99% statistical significance. The indicated probabilities as well as all marginal 
effects (and standard errors) are multiplied by 100, so that they reflect probabilities in percentages and marginal effects in %-points.  





Overall, we find that recent export starters will more likely enter new markets than firms that already exported 
to other countries. Entry to new markets becomes easier if the firm already exports to nearby countries, thus 
pointing to a stepping stone strategy. Further, firm size and productivity affect positively the probability to enter 
new export markets. Market characteristics are also decisive in entering markets. Higher trade costs, whether 
caused by distance or higher import tariffs, lower the probability to enter a new market as is also the case for a 
smaller market (lower GDP). The probability to enter an export market is at most 0.1%-point higher if bilateral 
chambers of commerce, NBSO’s and trade mission are present. This is quite substantial if the average observed 
market entry probability is about 1.8%. The export probability also increases if there are more firms exporting to 
the same country. 
 
 
5  Export growth 
5.1  Basic model 
The theoretical and empirical literature suggests that if market entry appears to be successful, exports of new 
entrants may grow more rapidly than the sales of incumbent exporters. The stylized facts on export growth in 
table 3.6 show that the average export growth per country of recent starters is twice as high as that of continuing 
exporters between 2005 and 2007.
32 To test this fact econometrically, we regress export growth on the status of 
exporters. The equation reads as:  
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  (5.1) 
with  the growth of the exports of exporter i to country  k in year  t. The dummy 2 ikt FY −  indicates 
whether exporter i entered country k two years ago (t-2). As discussed in section 2.1, we focus on export growth 
of a (recent) entrant in its third year and relate it to the export growth of incumbent exporters for the same 
calendar year. A positive impact of this dummy suggests that successful entrants would have higher export 
growth than incumbent exporters to country k. indicates that country  k is the first destination  of exporter 
i. The positive impact of the cross term  2 ikt ik FY FM − × would indicate that export growth of entrants would be 
even higher on their first market, thus pointing to an additional growth premium of new export starters.  
To verify the impact of the firm’s overall export strategy on export growth, we include the average export 
growth in the other destinations ( ). In case of strategic substitutes, export growth will only be higher 
for those markets on which the firm focuses its export capacity. In case of strategic complements, growth will be 
higher if the firm can benefit from serving many markets.  We use the same country determinants of the host 
 
32 See footnote 18.    23
country as in the entry equation, except that we also adopt the GDP-growth to control for cyclical effects. We 
also include firm’s characteristics such as the productivity level ( ) and employment size ( ).  
 
We estimate this equation by least squares (LS) with fixed effects, thereby adjusting for firm specific effects (
) and clustering the standard errors. The estimation results are presented in Table 5.1. All regressions reveal that 
growth is higher if exporters have just entered the market, which is in line with the literature mentioned in 
footnote 4. Exporting entrants would have a growth premium of 13%-point (in their third year) when compared 
to incumbent exporters. However, recent entrants have to face less export growth if the market is (one of) the 
first market(s). Eventually, the export growth of these recent starters would be 11%-point lower than the export 
growth of the incumbent exporters. The result on the growth of starters contrasts with the theory and the 
empirical findings of Albornoz et al (2010). The average export growth on other markets seems to enhance the 
export growth on this market. This suggests that exporters benefit from economies of scale in exporting to more 
countries, and thus consider markets as strategic complements.  
 
Table 5.1      Export growth on specific markets 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent variable 
export growth on specific market 
FY: entry in t-2  0.134***  0.130***  0.0860*** 
(0.0175)  (0.0173)  (0.0251) 
FM: entry on first market  0.00315  0.00194  -0.248 
(0.0801)  (0.0799)  (0.199) 
FY x FM  -0.239***  -0.245***  -0.325*** 
(0.0660)  (0.0664)  (0.0912) 
Average growth other markets  0.562***  0.563***  0.520*** 
(0.0306)  (0.0305)  (0.0405) 
Log GDP  -0.0111*** 
(0.00248) 
D log GDP  0.964***  1.099*** 
(0.111)  (0.128) 
Log Distance  -0.00492  -0.00696*  -0.00523 
(0.00418)  (0.00416)  (0.00559) 
Log tariffs  -0.00240**  -0.00172  -0.00126 
(0.00117)  (0.00116)  (0.00151) 
LP: log productivity (lag)  -0.0279 
(0.0468) 
LE: log employment (lag)  -0.00499 
(0.0661) 
Method  LS with FE  LS with FE  LS with FE 
No. Observations  123273  123273  68600 
No. Exporters  6353  6353  3114 
R-squared (within)  0.064  0.065  0.044 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are clustered standard errors. ***, ** and * denote respectively 99%, 95% and 90% statistical significance. 24 
 
Further, export growth seems to be higher in smaller countries. This might seem surprising, but there are two 
potential explanations. First, it may point to the rise of new markets for instance in Middle and Eastern Europe 
and Asia between 2002 and 2008. Second, firms that enter smaller markets with less competitors may attain 
higher market shares at a higher pace  (see also Melitz and Ottoviano (2008)). GDP growth in the host country 
has a positive impact on export growth to that country, as expected. In our country example, the decline of US 
GDP in 2007 by 7% would be fully translated to a decline in export volume of 7% on the American market, this 
in contrast to export growth on the Austrian market of 3.4%. Distance and import tariffs have in general a 
negative, but not significant or robust impact on export growth. The regression results also reveal that firm 
characteristics, particularly the firm’s levels in labour productivity and employment, have no significant impact 
on the export growth.  
 
5.2  Impact of policy instruments and spillovers 
We also investigate the impact of policy instruments on export growth which are added to equation (5.1). Table 
5.2 presents for each variant the results of the main variables of interest. The first row reveals that export growth 
is positively correlated with the presence of embassies,consulates and NBSO’s. It increases trade by 2.4%-point 
which is still substantial. The number of NSBO’s does not affect the growth of exports. The number of trade 
missions has also a positive and significant impact, but chambers of commerce have no impact. The average 
firm export growth on a market is 4.4%-points higher if it is visited by one extra trade mission. This effect 
seems substantial, but has to be compared with the export growth per market for continuing exporters (on 
average nearly 22% per year between 2005 and 2007) and for recent starters (on average 39% in the third year 
of exporting in the same period). Nitsch (2007) predicts a somewhat smaller effect of 2 to 3% on total bilateral 
exports, for which the growth figures are also lower. He finds that this effect dies out quickly; we do not have 
the data to check this.  
The policy instruments could be affected by the dynamics of the market, such as the rise of the BRICs. For 
instance, table 3.7 shows that the number of Dutch missions per BRIC-country is much higher than for the EU 
members. Moreover, the decisions for trade missions could be affected by the size of the market and other 
variables related to trade growth. For both reasons we apply the same instrumental variables approach as for 
market entry. For the establishments of the chambers of commerce and the number of NSBOs the results do not 
change. Their impact on export growth is still negligible. For trade missions the effects are somewhat larger, but 
do not differ statistically significantly from the first regression. For the presence of NBSO’s this is different. The 
coefficients double in size suggesting that export growth is 6% higher in destinations with NSBO’s. Also for 
export growth we have tested whether the presence of NBSO’s or trade missions contributed more to export 
growth of recent exporters than of incumbents. We did not find a significant difference. 
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Table 5.2  Export growth and economic diplomacy 
Dependent variable: 












Non-adjusted policy instruments    
 with all countries  0.00753  0.0241**  -0.000602  0.0443***  0.0168 
(0.00882)  (0.00965)  (0.00192)  (0.0122)  (0.0302) 
 
Policy instruments adjusted  for 
GDP, distance to the Netherlands   
 with all countries  0.00358  0.0557***  0.00400  0.0535*** 
(0.00919)  (0.0128)  (0.00258)  (0.0128) 
        high income countries    0.0322***  0.0216 
  (0.0142)  (0.0135) 
        low income countries    0.118***  0.126*** 
  (0.0298)  (0.0288) 
 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are clustered standard errors. ***, ** and * denote respectively 99%, 95% and 90% statistical significance.  All 
regressions are estimated with LS with fixed effects. The coefficients and standard errors of the other variables from the baseline model are 
similar to those in Table 5.1, column 3. 
 
We have distinguished the impact of economic diplomacy instruments for high and middle income countries. 
We focus on the presence of NBSO’s and trade missions, because these have a significant correlation with 
export growth in the sample of all 50 countries. Using policy instruments adjusted for country specific factors, 
we find remarkable differences. For the high income countries, there is a positive but small impact of both 
policy instruments on export growth. For the middle income countries, these instruments have a more 
substantial impact on export growth. The presence of a NBSO (or embassy trade post) or an (additional) trade 
mission would both induce an increase 12%-point in export growth. 
Finally, we have analysed the impact of spillover effects on the export growth per country. We include the 
spillover-variables and apply the cluster procedure as discussed in section 4.2. The results in Table 5.3 show that 
only country spillovers have a positive and significant impact on the export growth per country.   
For export growth, we conclude that recent entrants on new markets have a higher export growth than 
incumbent exporters. Recent market entry of starters has no significant positive impact on export growth 
compared to experienced exporters. Trade missions and NBSO’s are positively correlated to export growth as 
are knowledge spillovers from firms exporting to the same market. 
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export growth on specific market   
 
No. exporters in  same  municipality  0.161   
(0.186)   
No. exporters in same region  0.493   
(0.522)   
No. exporters in same industry  -0.487   
(0.357)   
No. exporters to same country




Method  LS with FE  LS with FE  LS with FE  LS with FE 
No. Observations  46177  44163  68507  45927 
Cluster variable   municipality  municipality  industry  exporter 
Number of clusters  373  329  40  2296 
R-squared (within)  0.0895  0.0916  0.0783  0.0543 
         
Notes: Numbers in brackets are clustered standard errors. *** denotes 99% statistical significance.  
The coefficients and standard errors of the other variables from the baseline model are similar to those in Table 5.1, colum3. 
 
 
6  Exit from markets 
Starting and incumbent exporters can also decide to leave an export market.
33 Due to uncertainties firms start 
exporting by trial and error exercise and find out whether a market is profitable for them. In many cases it is not, 
and they leave the export market quickly. We test whether entrants are more likely to exit a specific market 
rather than incumbent exporters. The empirical model reads  
0 1 1 2 3 1
4 , , 5 6 7
8 1 9 1
log log log log
log log
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= + + + ×
+ ∆ + + +
+ + + +
  (6.1) 
with the probability that exporter i will exit country  k in year  t+1 A positive coefficient of   
confirms the major assertion on exit. A positive effect of the cross-term   indicates that starting 
exporters have an even higher probability to exit their first export destination, i.e. country k.  We also include 
the export growth in other countries as indicators of strategic complements or substitutes. A positive coefficient 
suggests that the exporter focuses on other (growth-)markets and retreats from the current market k  (strategic 
substitutes). A negative impact indicates that the exporter benefits from serving more markets (strategic 
 
33 See Alvarez and Lopez (2008), Freund and Pierola (2010) and Eaton et al. (2007).   27
complements). As in previous sections we add the regular country variables to control for country specific 
effects. We also we include the firm’s characteristics and their interaction with . The theory suggests that 
a higher productivity level may reduce the probability to exit, because higher efficiency raises the chance to 
survive and to become profitable.  
 
This equation is estimated with a probit method including random effects to adjust for non observed firm 
specific effects. We use a data set comprising of all exporters in the previous year, of which some will exit the 
market in this year while the others will continue exporting to this market. In terms of figure 2.1, we include 
firms F1 to F3 because until year 3 they all export to country X, and after year 3 firm F3 will exit while firms F1 
and F2 continue their exports to country X.
34  
 
The estimation results on the probability to exit markets are presented in table 6.1. The first and most appealing 
result is that recent entrants on each market have a 9 to10%-point higher chance to exit a market rather than 
incumbent exporters. This difference is relatively high, knowing that the observed average probability to exit is 
11-15% depending on the sample. But there is one reservation: recent starters seem to exert more patience with 
learning on their first market, because they have only a 3%-point higher probability to exit than incumbent 
exporters in the second regression.
35 This overall effect just confirms the theory discussed in section 2.1. 
Albornoz et al (2010) also find negative coefficients for the additional effect of recent starters, but only in case 
of adjustment for firm specific effects. Without adjustment for firm specific effects they find positive effects. 
Onkelinx and Sleuwaegen (2010) conclude that recent export starters (labelled as born globals) have a 9% 
higher exit probability than old traders. 
The average export growth on other markets reduces the probability to exit the current market. This result 
(again) points to complementary benefits in serving more markets. The impact of the country characteristics on 
exit is consistent with ex ante expectations. Exporters have a higher probability to exit if the market is smaller 
and geographically more distant, and if the country levies higher import tariffs. In our comparison between the 
USA and Austria, the “size advantage” of the USA provides a 9 to 11%-point smaller chance to exit the US 
market, but this advantage is (again) largely offset by the large distance and import tariffs, creating 
disadvantages of respectively 7%-point and 1.5%-point higher chance to exit the USA. Combining all results, 
we find that Dutch exporters to the USA have 1 to 2%-point lower chance to exit than exporters to Austria. 
The coefficients on firm characteristics suggest that larger incumbent exporters have a lower probability to 
exit than smaller exporters. Labour productivity has no significant impact on the chance to exit. 
   
 
34 We do not include failures, i.e. entrants that exit the market within the same year. 
35 In fact, the coefficient of FY×FM, which only holds for firms that recently have started to export, largely offsets the positive coefficient of FY.  28 
 
 
Table 6.1  Exit from specific market (marginal effects in percentage points)  
(1)  (2) 
Dependent variable 
exit from specific market 
FY: entry in t-1  9.417**  10.702*** 
(0.340)  (0.492) 
FM: entry on first market  -2.301**  1.436 
(1.09)  (1.63) 
FY x FM
  -13.976**  -9.127*** 
(0.590)  (0.575) 
Average growth other markets  -2.619**  -1.892*** 
(0.141)  (0.174) 
Log GDP  -3.156***  -2.517*** 
(0.084)  (0.103) 
Log Distance  3.887***  3.442*** 
(0.139)  (0.164) 
Log tariffs  0.441***  0.393*** 
(0.0272)  (0.029) 
LP: log productivity  0.517 
(0.360) 
LE: log employment  -1.644*** 
(0.248) 
Observed probability to exit  14.858  11.819 
Method  probit with RE  probit with RE 
No observations  221982  116183 
Log likelihood  -71766  -31557 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard error. *** and ** denote respectively 99% and 95% statistical 
significance. The indicated probabilities as well as all marginal effects (and standard errors) are multiplied 
by 100 so that they reflect probabilities in % and marginal effects in %-points. 
 
To conclude this section, we find that entrants have a higher chance to exit a specific market than incumbent 
exporters on that market, except for recent starters on their first market. Further, exporters will more likely exit a 
country if the country is small and more distant, and if it has higher tariffs. We also find that smaller exporters 
have a higher chance to exit, but we find no significant and robust impact of productivity.  
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7  Concluding remarks 
This paper examines firm and market determinants of market entry, export growth and market exit. We exploit a 
rich database of international trade transactions of Dutch firms between 2002 and 2008 and link these data to 
other firm data and export market characteristics.  From the data we learn that most exporting firms continue to 
export to specific destinations, and that a substantial share of the firms enters new markets. The gross turmoil of 
firms starting or ceasing to export is about 5% of the total number of exporters, but the net effect is much 
smaller. The recent starters export on average much less than the average continuer. This suggests a strong 
persistence of exporting, particularly for successful starters to attain the higher (average) export level. When 
entering new markets, exporters (either starting or continuing exporters) may fail to continue exporting or to 
increase their sales at the new markets. Entrants typically leave the export market or increase their exports very 
fast. Their export growth of recent starters in their third year as exporter is about twice as high as for continuing 
Dutch exporters. 
We investigate not only the role of recent starters with respect to market entry and exit and export growth, 
but also the role of export market and firm characteristics. The econometric analysis confirms the stylized facts 
and results for other countries. Entry on new markets entails high export growth or swift exit if entry is 
unsuccessful.  
Firms that recently started to export are more likely to expand their number of export markets than 
incumbent exporters. Entry to new markets becomes easier if the firm already exports to nearby destinations, 
and thus uses the latter countries as a kind of stepping stone. The stepping stone is particularly relevant for 
recent starters. Further, larger and more productive firms are more likely to enter new markets than smaller and 
less productive firms. Less experienced exporters have also a higher probability to leave export markets. These 
firm characteristics have no impact on export growth. Market characteristics neither matter for export growth 
(except GDP growth), but distance to the Netherlands and import tariffs reduce the probability to enter a new 
market and increase the chance to exit. Larger markets seem to attract more entrants and reduce the number of 
exits. 
Our results for Dutch exporters stress the role of recent exporters on export markets and their high growth 
figures if they are successful. Fresh exporters seem to be more dynamic but also more vulnerable. This paper 
does not concluder why these firms are more vulnerable. The export experimentation literature suggests that 
firms have to learn their own capabilities with respect to exporting and to learn the business climate and 
consumer tastes and demand in the foreign destinations. One way of doing this is trial and error by firms 
themselves. Providing information on the necessary skills for exporting and on the foreign markets could be 
helpful for stimulating the presence of firm at foreign markets. Additional regressions reveal that the presence of 
support offices and trade missions to destination countries, particularly middle income countries, stimulate the 
entry of new exporters and export volume. This suggests that institutions could be helpful in reducing the 
uncertainty of Dutch firms, although there may be some doubts on the causality between export entry and 
economic diplomacy. A third possibility is that firms learn from other exporters. Knowledge spillovers from 
exporters with the same destinations have similar positive effects on export entry. 30 
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8  Appendix A:  Economic diplomacy per country 










presence  (Y / N) 
number of 
establishments  number   number 
EU15 
Austria  Y  0  0  0 
Belgium  Y  1  0  11 
Denmark  N  1  0  1 
Finland  N  1  1  1 
France  N  4  0  6 
Germany  N  7  4  22 
Greece  N  0  0  1 
Ireland  N  0  0  5 
Italy  N  2  0  5 
Luxembourg  Y  0  0  1 
Portugal  Y  0  0  2 
Spain  N  1  1  4 
Sweden  N  1  1  0 
United Kingdom   Y  2  1  8 
EU12 
Bulgaria  N  0  2  1 
Cyprus  N  0  0  0 
Czech Republic  Y  1  2  6 
Estonia  N  0  1  0 
Hungary  Y  1  1  0 
Latvia  Y  0  1  0 
Lithuania  N  0  1  0 
Malta  N  0  0  0 
Poland  Y  1  4  4 
Romania  Y  1  2  5 
Slovakia  Y  1  2  3 
Slovenia  N  0  1  1 
rest OECD 
Australia  N  0  1  0 
Canada  N  4  0  3 
Iceland  N  0  0  0 
Israel  Y  0  0  0 
Japan  Y  2  0  3 
Norway  N  1  0  0 
Republic of Korea  N  1  1  0 
Switzerland  N  0  0  1 
Turkey  N  3  4  7 







   
China  Y  11  4  14 
India  N  4  3  3 
Russian Federation  N  3  4  8 
Rest top 50 
Croatia  N  0  2  1 
Egypt  N  0  1  0 
Hong Kong  Y  0  0  0 
Israel  Y  0  0  0 
Malaysia  N  0  0  1 
Saudi Arabia  N  1  0  2 
Singapore  N  0  0  1 
South Africa  Y  0  2  4 
Taiwan  N  1  0  0 
Ukraine  N  1  3  9 
United Arab Emirates  N  2  1  5   35
Table 8.2     Number of assignment of CPA’s to branches of industry 
SITC-
code  Branch of industry 
number of CPA's 
2005-2006 
1  Agriculture  1 
11  Crude petroleum and natural gas  1 
15  Food products and beverages  9 
17  Textiles  3 
18  Wearing apparel  5 
22  Publishing and printing  6 
23  Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel  1 
24  Chemicals and chemical products  1 
26  Other non-metallic mineral products  2 
27  Basic metals  2 
28  Fabricated metal products  5 
29  Machinery and equipment n.e.c.  8 
30  Office machinery and computers  1 
31  Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.  0 
33  Medical and optical instruments, watches and clocks  11 
35  Other transport equipment  18 
36  Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  7 
40  Electricity and gas  8 
41  Water supply  0 
45  Construction  16 
51  Wholesale trade  1 
52  Retail trade  0 
60  Land transport and  pipelines  1 
61  Water transport  1 
62  Air transport  3 
63  Supporting and auxiliary transport activities  7 
72  Computer and related activities  7 
73  Research and development  6 
74  Other business activities  1 
80  Education  5 
90  Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities  15 
92  Recreational, cultural and sporting activities  0 
93  Other service activities  1 
Total  153 
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9  Appendix B: robustness checks on selection bias 
9.1  Entry 
We apply various robustness checks, amongst other to check for potential bias due to missing observations of 
small trade values. Table 9.1 presents the results of the baseline regression (column (2) in Table 4.1), but now 
with sub-sets parts of the data.  
First, we remove the mass of firms that continue to export in the whole period to at least ten countries in 
each year; in this way we only keep firms that have started to export, firms that have fully ceased to export 
and/or continuers with relatively few destinations. Still, the overall probability to enter new markets is slightly 
smaller than in the baseline. In that sense most variables have a smaller impact as well, but they all have the 
expected sign and remain significant.   
Second, we adopt only firms with total exports exceeding 1 million euro in each year that they are in the 
dataset; in this way we remove exporters that may be surveyed in one year and being expelled from the survey 
in the other year, because their total exports fluctuate around the threshold for surveying. As a consequence the 
observed and also predicted probability to enter new markets is much larger, but also the underlying 
determinants. The direct effect of being a new starter increases as well but becomes non-significant.  
Third, we only include exports to non-EU countries.
36 In this way we only use detailed product-destination 
data that are fully registered by the customs. However, less firms serve non-EU destinations. On average the 
non-EU markets are more difficult to enter than the EU markets due to the internal market in Europe, the 
smaller distances and higher incomes. The probability to enter these markets is lower. Being a recent starter has 
no significant effect on market entry, but the stepping stone strategy remains particularly relevant for starters.  It 
could be the case that firms have to build up more export experience before they are able to expand their export 
to less accessible, non-EU countries. Moreover, the impact of the country characteristics in particular is reduced, 
but remains significant.  
  Finally, we also estimate equation (4.1) with only firms in the PS-database and omit the largest firms from 
the SFGO-database. The results, however, point to slightly differences with the baseline regression including the 
larger firms. This outcome is not surprising, because in the regressions the impact of larger firms is relatively 
small due to their small share in number of firms.   
   
 
36 To be precisely, we removed the data of the EU-15 countries and the countries that joined the EU from 2004 over the whole period 2002-2008.   37
Table 9.1        Robustness checks on entry equation (marginal effects in percentage points) 
only start/stop  exports>1mln  only non-EU  only PS-data 
Dependent variable 
dummy on entry on specific market 
FY: start to export in t-1  0.158***  0.496  0.077  0.188*** 
(0.044)  (0.343)  (0.076)  (0.071) 
LA: Log distance to nearest  market  -0.187***  -1.052***  -0.286***  -0.374*** 
       (in t-1 and t)  (0.013)  (0.060)  (0.022)  (0.018) 
LA x FY  -0.123***  -0.578***  -0.231***  -0.183*** 
(0.035)  (0.271)  (0.087)  (0.068) 
Log GDP  0.122***  0.594***  0.120***  0.207*** 
(0.044)  (0.052)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Log Distance  -0.197***  -1.060***  -0.184***  -0.340*** 
(0.010)  (0.051)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Log tariffs  -0.011***  -0.094***  -0.006***  -0.023*** 
(0.001)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
LP: log productivity  0.031***  0.233***  0.085***  0.094*** 
(0.011)  (0.079)  (0.020)  (0.019) 
LE: log employment  0.085***  0.514***  0.165***  0.221*** 
(0.008)  (0.052)  (0.012)  (0.018) 
Observed probability to enter  1.229  3.176  1.100  1.666 
Method  probit with RE  probit with RE  probit with RE  probit with RE 
No observations  489161  153864  272565  546576 
Log likelihood  -26281  -19298  -14683  -38662 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard error. *** and ** denote respectively 99% and 95% statistical significance. The indicated probabilities 
as well as all marginal effects (and standard errors) are multiplied by 100 so that they reflect probabilities in % and marginal effects in %-
points. 
 
9.2  Export growth 
We apply various robustness checks on the third regression in table 5.1. The first regression includes only to 
starters, stoppers and exporters to a few countries. The results do not change substantially, except that the 
impact of labour productivity becomes more negative and significant, while the impact of changes in GDP 
becomes non-significant. If we would only include firms with at least 1mln in total exports per each year, the 
effects are the same. In the regression with only non-EU countries, exporting to the first export market would 
have a positive effect on export growth as is the interaction between both. However this effect and the 
interaction with entry are not significant. The impact of higher tariffs on export growth is positive and 
significant. It is hard to judge whether the positive effects of recent market entry of starters on export growth are 
caused by the higher share of small exporters in this data set or the different destinations. Finally, the regression 
with only PS-data gives no substantial differences with the regression of the full dataset.  
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Table 9.2       Robustness checks on the export growth equation 
only start/stop  exports>1mln  only non-EU  only PS-data 
Dependent variable 
export growth on specific market 
FY:entry in t-2  0.0705*  0.104***  0.0948**  0.0789*** 
(0.0419)  (0.0304)  (0.0433)  (0.0272) 
FM: entry on first market  -0.292  -0.350  0.321  -0.121 
(0.202)  (0.253)  (0.268)  (0.189) 
FY x FM  -0.347***  -0.339***  -0.394  -0.383*** 
(0.106)  (0.0771)  (0.241)  (0.0924) 
Average growth other markets  0.338***  0.422***  0.285***  0.532*** 
(0.0505)  (0.0592)  (0.0543)  (0.0443) 
D log GDP  0.460  1.061***  0.404**  1.157*** 
(0.286)  (0.133)  (0.164)  (0.160) 
Log Distance  -0.00339  -0.00794  -0.0164*  -0.000608 
(0.0119)  (0.00617)  (0.00992)  (0.00613) 
Log tariffs  0.00239  -0.00104  0.00396**  -0.000882 
(0.00503)  (0.00153)  (0.00199)  (0.00173) 
LP: log productivity  -0.169**  -0.00782  -0.00171  -0.0391 
(0.0714)  (0.0478)  (0.105)  (0.0458) 
LE: log employment  -0.00430  -0.0321  0.138  0.0215 
(0.0951)  (0.0607)  (0.123)  (0.0719) 
Method  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects 
No. Observations  19357  50757  21676  55682 
No. Exporters  2080  1359  1861  2820 
R2 (within)  0.0347  0.0162  0.0105  0.0509 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard error. ***, **  and * denote respectively 99%, 95% and 90% statistical significance. The indicated 
probabilities as well as all marginal effects and standard errors are multiplied by 100 so that they reflect probabilities in % and marginal effects in 
%-points. 
 
9.3  Exit 
Finally, we have also conducted some robustness checks with varying samples as in section 4 and 5, based on a 
similar model as (2) in table 6.1. Table 9.3 presents the outcomes. The regression with only starters, stoppers 
and smaller continuing exporters turn over some of the results for the whole sample. First, exporters on their 
first market attain a significant lower chance to exit. Second, the negative impact of employment becomes 
irrelevant.  
The regression with only firms with total exports above 1 million euro shows that a higher productivity 
increases the exit probability for all exporters. In the regression for only non-EU destinations productivity has a 
positive and significant effect, contrasting to the theory. Interestingly, the exit probability for entrants at the non-
EU markets is high. These markets are not only more difficult to enter, but are also more difficult to survive. 
Given that the uncertainty in many of these markets is much higher than in the EU, this result is consistent with   39
the theories of Rauch and Watson and Albornoz et al. (2010). The regression with only PS-data points to a 
negative impact of labour productivity, which fits the theory in section 2.1. 
 
Table 9.3  Robustness checks on the exit equation (marginal effects in percentage-points) 
only start/stop  exports>1mln  only non-EU  only PS-data 
Dependent variable 
export growth on specific market 
FY: entry in t-1  6.523***  10.137***  18.171***  10.810*** 
(0.680)  (0.600)  (0.857)  (0.523) 
FM: entry on first market  -6.188***  3.904***  7.367**  1.552 
(1.737)  (1.459)  (3.389)  (1.807) 
FY x FM  -11.536***  -5.095***  -14.363***  -9.638*** 
(1.261)  (0.312)  (1.045)  (0.592) 
Average growth other markets  -2.658***  -1.458***  -2.047***  -2.088*** 
(0.272)  (0.230)  (0.334)  (0.190) 
Log GDP  -2.983***  -1.565***  -3.405***  -2.406*** 
(0.174)  (0.089)  (0.171)  (0.109) 
Log Distance  4.415***  2.383***  3.966***  3.327*** 
(0.285)  (0.145)  (0.318)  (0.175) 
Log tariffs  0.155**  0.247***  0.284***  0.396*** 
(0.064)  (0.021)  (0.0491)  (0.0326) 
LP: log productivity  0.952  0.978***  0.397  -0.835** 
(0.667)  (0.268)  (0.644)  (0.392) 
LE: log employment  0.124  -0.284  -0.939**  -1.340*** 
(0.475)  (0.195)  (0.384)  (0.322) 
 Observed probability to exit  22.331  7.869  15.157  12.278 
Method  probit with RE  probit with RE  probit with RE  probit with RE 
No observations  42775  79765  38821  95030 
Log likelihood  -17477  -16563  -13434  -26808 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard error. ***  and ** denote respectively 99% and 95% statistical significance. The indicated probabilities as 
well as all marginal effects and standard errors are multiplied by 100 so that they reflect probabilities in % and marginal effects in %-points. 
 
 